The road march thing on Wednesday. To much control! As an alternative, the Commander might give guidance to run a total of x-number of miles per week and road march a total of x-number of miles per month. This forces subordinate commanders to make decisions. Platoon Leader development, et al. As an example, the Battalion Commander's guidance might be road march development weekly. Further, he might define the road march as tactical foot march, conditioning foot march, or tactical dismounted patrolling. The Company Commander then provides further guidance by stating 12-miles per week minimum or, for example, 12-mile tactical foot march at a 3-mph pace (increasing the pace per week; or, the weight or packing list, etc). The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant then plan to meet the training guidance. Using the above examples, two possible solutions might be...
1) a 12-mile foot march on Wednesday, with a 50-pound packing list at 3 mph.
2) Two 6-mile foot marches, one on Tuesday and one on Thursday. Tuesday foot march is with a 50 pound packing list at 3 mph. Thursday packing list is a patrol with an 80-pound packing.
This principle, when properly applied gives subordinate leaders the greatest opportunity for decision making development, an area that is severly deficient in our leader development programs. Perhaps, as part of our organizational evolution, we might start looking at ways to further decentralize the decision making process to develop leaders more proficient at sound, snap decisions in stressful situations like - oh, combat.
This is most likely my continued appreciation for NCO development programs of the German Army after WWI. As an example, during one field problem, I argued with one of my Lieutenants about our maneuver. In short, the solution called for the machine guns to set up and start shooting. The guns would cease fire when the assault squads would cut diagonally in front of them and start a bounding assault on the objective, providing their own security. "Why don't they flank and assault from the side, so the guns can keep firing?" I asked. I was told it was the approved solution. I could go on for a good couple pages on this, and I might actually hotlink a PDF file with imagery later to show what we were doing and what I was recommending, but the point here is that, the solution had be provided by higher and deviation was not allowed.
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2 comments:
Dorian,
Should you continue to develop as a leader in the Conventional Army never let go of this thought process. You speak of things the SOF community has been doing for many years and will in the future. The Conventional side has tremendous weakeness within its junior NCO development. With the continued lowering of Physical Fitness Test standards and general softness towards the physcological development of junior enlisted you cannot help but end up with a poor product. Officers have found themselves forced to control that which was solely left to the NCO Corp. I grew disgusted by all of it and left with a personal journey to better myself and my family.
Nevertheless, you are in position to make effective change in the future. Everything you have stated makes perfect sense and remains obvious to those of us who can think outside of the proverbial box. However, there are those who embrace the mentality "if it ain't broke don't fix it," like a mantra or the very essence of military life.
Should the Army evolve and embrace the standards long forgotten, I believe there is a place for what you desire within the Conventional Ranks. I firmly believe this will be the result of solid NCO's, like yourself, who will recapture what officers have clearly taken from the "backbone of the Army."
God speed my friend.
I have found there to be a great weakness in the professional development model of our NCO Corps. When I first came in, there used to be a self-development test that, though inefficient, at least attempted to mitigate stagnant development programs. I never had to take one, so I had nothing to go off, but Doug Maddi, a friend and mentor, attempted to implement a program in our company that demanded performance based evaluations, including query-response models for team leaders and above. Hidari Sasaki, my Command Sergeant Major at the time, demanded all NCOPD be tactically oriented, given that we were, in fact, tacticians by trade. He even implemented a testing procedure, in which he put a platoon on alert and sent them on a stress fire. It was supposed to progress from there, but never went further after CSM Sasaki left.
This time we came back and did a plethora of NCOPD on counseling, PT, drill and ceremonies, and UCMJ. Clearly, the emphasis - and reality - has shifted.
I find that, in my 16+ years in service, there is one premise concerning training that has proven true. What makes Special Forces and Ranger Regiment so elite is not that they are doing any task different than the Infantry. It is that they do the tasks so often and to such demanding standards that they don't have a choice but to be better. That, my friend, is why the Infantry will never reach its true potential.
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