On approach, 31 December 2008

As we make our approach on New York, I find myself reflecting on Iraq and contemplating whether or not I will put my consolidated writings into one of our expensive journals. I keep thinking of mine and Lieutenant Carlisle's early discussions about patrolling the muhallahs. My first assessment had been that we could turn 10 percent, that 10 percent would remain ardent enemy, and the other 80 percent would passively support both sides. There was not scientific basis on these numbers and I was probably musing to begin with.

I remember talking about gaining popular support from the locals and how key terrain, as a tactical term, was obsolete unless one regarded the people as key terrain. In a counter-insurgency, the only consideration is how to leverage the population from the insurgent. Everything else must support that objective. Think in second and third orders of effects. If the people are dissatisfied, they will eventually rebel. But if they are satisfied, then the insurgent has nothing on which to base his claims and nothing to offer.